Contain and investigate
Stopped the active compromise and reconstructed the timeline from tenant audit logs.
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A training and education technology company recovered from business email compromise, removed the attackers’ persistent foothold in Entra and rebuilt access across Microsoft 365, Azure and Google Workspace.
Compromised company accounts were used to send phishing messages to clients. Attackers had established persistence inside Entra that would have survived password resets, administrative accounts faced sustained brute-force pressure, several shared team accounts had MFA disabled because a personal second factor did not fit how the function was used, and client collaboration sometimes depended on personal Google accounts.
Rainbow Secure contained the active incident, reconstructed the timeline from tenant audit logs, removed attacker persistence from Entra and restored the tenant to a known-good identity configuration. It then secured all 60 Microsoft accounts with rSecureKey MFA, converted 12 shared functions to named Team Access, hardened administrative access, extended governed Entra access to the Azure client environment and federated Google Workspace to the company domain.
Recovery required both halves of the problem to be solved: remove the foothold already created inside Entra and close the authentication path used to return. Rainbow Secure also made MFA practical for shared functions instead of asking the customer to repeat a control design that employees had already found unworkable.
Stopped the active compromise and reconstructed the timeline from tenant audit logs.
Cleaned the identity objects and configuration that could survive a password reset.
Validated the identity environment back to a known-good state.
Applied rSecureKey MFA across all 60 accounts.
Converted 12 team accounts to named, individually authenticated access.
Governed Entra and Azure administrative access under continuing attack pressure.
Moved shared documents to managed identities on the company domain.
Phishing from a trusted company address can damage confidence beyond the technical incident.
Compromise creates invoice fraud, impersonation and contract-manipulation risk.
Identity disruption can affect organizations and learners relying on the platform.
Improper access can create contractual and institutional exposure.
A compromised leadership identity can make fraudulent requests appear legitimate.
The active compromise was contained in under 48 hours and attacker persistence was removed from Entra. Sixty accounts received multidimensional MFA, twelve shared functions moved to named Team Access, more than 100 administrative brute-force attempts were blocked each week, and the source case study records six months without another account-related incident.
Verified engagement results from the supplied EdTech BEC Recovery case study. FERPA applies to the education-technology vendor through customer contracts and the school-official relationship where applicable; this story does not claim blanket FERPA compliance.We can map the users, applications, access risks and evidence requirements involved in your first use case.
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